Beyond individual excellence: reforms Madagascar’s universities can begin now

Part 2 of a three-part series on strengthening research and higher education in Madagascar – by Sarobidy Rakotonarivo

Madagascar’s universities need greater public investment. But many reforms required to improve recruitment, teaching, research and accountability do not depend primarily on major new funding. Greater transparency, clearer incentives and formal recognition of academic contributions could begin now, using limited additional resources but requiring real institutional commitment.

A career conversation that stayed with me

I began thinking seriously about this article while I was a visiting fellow at Oxford earlier this year. During a family trip to North Wales, I had just spoken with international Master’s students at Bangor University about academic careers. They were surprised to learn that, despite my research experience and long-standing affiliation with the University of Antananarivo, I still did not hold a permanent university position in Madagascar.

Their surprise stayed with me because my situation is far from unique. Many Malagasy academics spend years working as vacataires, project researchers, consultants or informal university affiliates while waiting for a limited and unpredictable public recruitment opportunity. Some remain in this uncertainty for a decade or more.

This is why recruitment should sit at the centre of any serious discussion about higher-education reform. Universities cannot renew themselves, retain talent or plan for the future when access to an academic career depends on sporadic recruitment rounds that researchers cannot anticipate.

Recruitment is the gateway to almost everything else

Madagascar’s academic employment system reflects the French administrative tradition inherited from the colonial period. Public-university lecturers and researchers enter state corps as fonctionnaires, gaining valuable employment stability and some protection from political or managerial pressure. But this security is not consistently matched by strong systems for evaluation, professional development or accountability. The system therefore places enormous weight on entering the corps while paying much less attention to sustained performance thereafter.

Having worked in universities where departments recruit for specific expertise, courses are regularly evaluated and promotion depends partly on continued academic performance, I have often been struck by the contrast. In Madagascar, entering the corps can be extraordinarily difficult, yet there may be relatively little structured scrutiny once someone is inside it. A fonctionnaire generally remains a fonctionnaire, whether their teaching and research continue to develop or not.

Recruitment determines access to salary, promotion, institutional authority, doctoral leadership and long-term academic recognition. Yet opportunities have been extremely infrequent and procedures have often lacked the openness expected of a genuinely merit-based system. Vacancies, disciplinary priorities, selection criteria and scoring are not always clearly published. In that environment, personal, family or political connections can appear to matter more than scientific merit. Many researchers describe this not as an occasional suspicion, but as an obvious feature of the system. Whether every allegation is justified is almost beside the point: a process that cannot demonstrate its fairness will inevitably lose public and professional trust.

For researchers trained abroad, the dilemma is especially difficult. I returned in 2020 because I wanted to contribute to research and higher education at home. I was fortunate to build Mitsilo, secure international research funding and remain closely connected to ESSA-Forêts, my alma mater at the University of Antananarivo. But a national system should not depend on returning researchers being able to create alternative institutions around themselves because the formal academic pathway is inaccessible.

A credible recruitment system would publish multi-year staffing plans, advertise every post openly, use transparent scoring criteria, involve external disciplinary experts and disclose aggregate results. Meritocracy cannot rest on assurances; it must be visible in the design and documentation of the process.

Recognition and accountability should continue after recruitment

The system should not only scrutinise entry into the corps. It should also recognise and evaluate what academics contribute after recruitment. Promotion should reflect a balanced record of teaching, rigorous research, supervision, mentoring, institutional service and engagement with policy or society—not simply seniority or the number of publications.

Universities could introduce transparent workload frameworks, regular professional review and clearer expectations for teaching and research. These mechanisms should support improvement and recognise excellence, while also creating a fair way to address persistent underperformance. Employment security and academic freedom are valuable, but they should not mean the absence of professional accountability.

The same principle applies to researchers outside permanent corps. People who supervise students, lead projects and contribute to university life should be able to receive formal institutional recognition through clearly regulated affiliated or contract-based roles, even when a permanent civil-service post is not immediately available.

Good teaching needs feedback and continual renewal

While at Oxford, I audited courses taught by leading scholars. I was struck by how closely the lectures engaged with current evidence and how strongly students were encouraged to question it. But what impressed me was not only the lecturers themselves. It was the institutional culture around them: regular academic exchange, peer discussion and systematic student feedback.

In Madagascar, it is tempting to criticise lecturers for reusing old material or failing to update courses. Yet institutions rarely provide consistent mechanisms for curriculum review or feedback. Universities could introduce regular course review, confidential student evaluations and peer discussion of teaching. These reforms require careful design, but not major new infrastructure.

Student feedback should be developmental rather than punitive and should never be used mechanically. Combined with peer review and clear learning objectives, it can help lecturers identify what works, what needs improvement and whether courses remain connected to current knowledge.

Research quality responds to the incentives we create

I was reminded of this when I was invited to give a session on publishing to doctoral researchers. I had prepared carefully, hoping to discuss how to produce work capable of withstanding rigorous peer review. Some participants explained candidly that their immediate goal was simply to obtain the publication required for graduation or professional advancement.

I initially found this discouraging. On reflection, however, their response was rational. If the system rewards the existence of a publication more than its quality, researchers will respond to that incentive. Clearer institutional rules could distinguish credible peer-reviewed work from predatory publishing, assess contribution rather than count alone, and reward quality more consistently.

Doctoral schools could also require clear supervision agreements, annual progress discussions, conflict-of-interest declarations and formal recognition of substantive co-supervisors. These reforms would make responsibility more visible and help reduce the gap between who appears on official documents and who actually provides supervision.

Madagascar should also support credible national and regional journals. A journal should not be dismissed simply because it is local or not internationally indexed. What matters is the transparency and quality of its peer-review and editorial processes.

Autonomy must come with transparency

University autonomy is not the same as privatisation. Public universities can remain publicly funded and socially accessible while receiving greater flexibility to manage partnerships, recognise affiliated researchers, organise internal reviews and develop programmes. But greater autonomy must be accompanied by open recruitment, clear governing arrangements, conflict-of-interest rules, audited accounts and meaningful staff and student representation.

Private institutions also have a role, but students need reliable information about accreditation, degree recognition, staffing and fees. Quality assurance should protect students across both public and private systems.

Six reforms that could begin without major new investment

Building institutions in which talent can thrive

Madagascar does not lack intelligence, ambition or commitment. I have met brilliant Malagasy and African scholars at home and abroad, worked with deeply committed university colleagues and supervised young researchers whose potential is extraordinary.

But individual excellence should not have to survive in spite of the system. Reform should not be framed as blaming lecturers, students, unions, university leaders or government officials. Most people respond to the incentives and constraints around them.

The task is to build institutions in which merit is visible, contribution is recognised and accountability continues after recruitment. Many of these changes could begin now; the next article will make the separate case for investment.